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STATUTORY SOURCES OF PROTECTION FOR
THE HANDICAPPED TRAVELER
VICTORIA JENSEN
THE DISABLED and air carriers have battled for many
years over the treatment of disabled in the airways.
The duration of the struggle is not surprising given the
early precedent. Rules adopted by the Civil Aeronautics
Board (CAB) in 1937 governing air travel by the "ill, de-
formed or disabled" were very restrictive.' It was not un-
til the passage of the Air Carrier Access Act of 19862 that
a law specifically prohibited air carrier discrimination
based on handicap.
While the ultimate goal of the struggle has been equal
treatment, the primary complaint of handicapped passen-
gers has been inconsistent treatment by air carriers. Expi-
ration of the early restrictive rules left air carriers to
devise policies and practices regarding handicapped pas-
sengers, guided only by the vague prohibition against dis-
crimination in both the Civil Aeronautics Act of 19383 and
the Federal Aviation Act of 1958.4 The result was incon-
sistent practices among air carriers and internal inconsis-
tency in individual air carriers' operations.
This inconsistency created substantial obstacles to air
David H. Capozzi, The Disabled Fly in Unfriendly Skies, 70 Bus. & Soc'v REV. 22,
25 (1989).
2 49 U.S.C. § 1374(c) (1988).
1 Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, Ch. 601, § 405(b), 52 Stat. 973, 1019 (current
version at 49 U.S.C. § 1374(b) (1988)).
4 Federal Aviation Act, Pub. L. No. 85-726, § 404(b), 72 Stat. 731, 760 (current
version at 49 U.S.C. § 1374 (1988)).
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travel by the disabled.5 Arrival of an unannounced dis-
abled traveler might be treated as routine on some occa-
sions while boarding was refused on others.6 One airline
might require an attendant while another did not.7 Even
the same airline might require an attendant at one city
and not at another.8 Some airlines forced handicapped
persons to exchange their wheelchairs for uncomfortable
airport chairs for boarding, while others allowed them to
remain in their own wheelchairs. 9 Some air carriers re-
quired disabled passengers to sign a waiver of liability
before boarding a plane.' 0 Powered wheelchair batteries
were either transported in baggage compartments or ex-
cluded altogether as unsafe for air transport." These in-
consistent policies and others have long made it difficult
for the disabled to plan uneventful air travel. Disabled
passengers have objected to inconsistent conditions not
only as inconvenient and unnecessary but also as
discriminatory.' 2
Exit row seating policies have been a particularly frus-
trating area of inconsistency, especially for the blind. In
an address delivered at the Annual Convention of the Na-
tional Federation of the Blind, KennethJernigan cited two
instances that illustrate the wide range of air carrier prac-
tices. In one case, a blind person was arrested for refus-
ing to move to a seat near the emergency exit.' 3 Only
days later a blind person was arrested for refusing to
move out of an exit row. 14 It is not hard to understand
why handicapped persons subjected to such extremely
5 Capozzi, supra note 1, at 22.
6 Id.
7 Id. at 22-23.
8 Id. at 23.
9Id.
t0 Capozzi, supra note 1, at 23.
1Id. at 24.
12 55 Fed. Reg. 8009 (1990).
IS Kenneth Jernigan, Air Travel and the Blind: The Struggle for Equality, Ad-
dress at the Annual Convention of the National Federation of the Blind (July 6,




arbitrary conditions consider themselves victims of
discrimination.
Passengers alleging discrimination by air carriers have
resorted to several statutory schemes for protection. This
comment will discuss various statutes that have been
available to protect passengers from discrimination by air
carriers. It will then focus on the narrow issues of dis-
crimination in seat assignments.' 5 Statutory sources of
protection from discrimination include the Federal Avia-
tion Act of 1958,16 section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act
of 1973,' 7 and the Air Carrier Access Act of 1986.18
Discrimination in seat assignments will be examined
primarily in the context of the most recently implemented
sources of protection. Those are the Department of
Transportation (DOT) and Federal Aviation Administra-
tion (FAA) rules on seating, particularly in exit rows.' 9
The inquiry of this examination is whether the new rules
represent a step forward in protecting airline passengers
from inconsistent and arguably discriminatory seating
practices, or whether they are a retreat.
I. THE FEDERAL AVIATION ACT OF 1958
Sections 404(a) and 404(b) of the Federal Aviation Act
of 1958 form the basis of an air carrier's duty to provide
non-preferential service to its passengers.2 ° Section
404(a) requires air carriers to provide air transportation
15 Of the many types of discrimination which have been alleged, the most prev-
alent has been discriminatory bumping. See Peter B. Heister, Discriminatory Bump-
ing, 40J. AIR L. & CoM. 533 (1974).
16 49 U.S.C. app. §§ 1301-1557 (1988) (section 1374(b) was originally enacted
in the Civil Aeronautics Act as 49 U.S.C. § 484(b)); see alsoJean F. Rydstrom, An-
notation, Availability of Private Civil Action For Violation of§ 404(b) of Federal Aviation
Act of 1958 (49 USCS § 1374(b)), Prohibiting Discrimination By Airline, 41 A.L.R. FED.
532, 534 n.1 (1979).
," 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1988).
18 49 U.S.C. § 1374(c) (1988).
1'9 55 Fed. Reg. 8008 (1990) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 382 § 37) (DOT);
55 Fed. Reg. 8054 (1990) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 121 § 585) (FAA).
20 49 U.S.C. § 1374(a) and (b) (1988) (corresponds to sections 404(a) and (b) of
the Civil Aeronatuics Act of 1938, supra note 3). Section 404(a) of the Federal
Aviation Act was amended in 1972 to include paragraph (a)(2) pertaining to rates.
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upon reasonable request.2' It also requires air carriers to
provide safe and adequate service, equipment and facili-
ties, and to establish just and reasonable rules, regula-
tions and practices.22 While this mandate would appear
to prohibit discriminatory treatment of passengers, courts
have repeatedly held that section 404(a) does not imply a
private right of action.23
Section 404(b) prohibits air carriers from giving unrea-
sonable preference to any person.2 4 It also prohibits sub-
jecting any person to unjust discrimination or any undue
or unreasonable prejudice. Courts first found an implied
private right of action under section 404(b) of the Civil
Aeronautics Act in Fitzgerald v. Pan American World Air-
ways.25 This seminal 1956 case recognized a private right
of action under section 404(b) for discriminatory treat-
ment of passengers by an air carrier.2 6 Ella Fitzgerald, an
internationally famous singer, her pianist, and her accom-
panist, all of whom were black, were not allowed to
reboard their plane and continue on to Australia in their
first class seats after a stopover in Honolulu, Hawaii. The
Act of March 22, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92, § 259, 86 Stat. 95, 96 (current version at
49 U.S.C. § 1374(a)(2) (1988)).
Section 404(a) provides in relevant part that
[it] shall be the duty of every air carrier to provide and furnish inter-
state and overseas air transportation, as authorized by its certificate,
upon reasonable request therefor and ... to provide safe and ade-
quate service, equipment, and facilities ... to establish, observe, and
enforce just and reasonable individual and joint rates, fares, and
charges, and just and reasonable classifications, rules, regulations,
and practices relating to such air transportation.
49 U.S.C. § 1374(a) (1988).
Section 404(b) provides in relevant part that: "[n]o air carrier shall make, give,
or cause any undue or unreasonable preference or advantage to any particular
person, port, locality, or description of traffic . . . whatsoever." 49 U.S.C.
§ 1374(b) (1988).
21 49 U.S.C. § 1374(a) (1988).
22 Id.
21 See Diefenthal v. CAB, 681 F.2d 1039 (5th Cir. 1982); Hingson v. Pacific
Southwest Airlines, 743 F.2d 1408 (9th Cir. 1984).
24 49 U.S.C. § 1374(b) (1988).
25 229 F.2d 499 (2d Cir. 1956), rev'd sub nom on other grounds, Prescription Plan
Serv. Corp. v. Franco, 552 F.2d 493 (2d Cir. 1977).
26 Id. at 501.
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court found the refusal was racially motivated conduct,
which amounted to "unjust discrimination and undue and
unreasonable prejudice and disadvantage, in violation of
section 404, subdivision (b)." 27
The court then held that a private right of action was
implied in section 404(b).2 8 In so holding, the court re-
jected the defendant's contention that the plaintiff's only
available remedy was a complaint to the Civil Aeronautics
Board.2 9 At most, the board could issue an order compel-
ling compliance in the future. The board could not order
the defendants in 1956 to allow the plaintiffs to board de-
fendant's plane in 1954.30 The court refused to restrict
plaintiffs to a remedy that would leave them unable to vin-
dicate a harmful violation of an actionable civil right.3 '
The private right of action for violation of section
404(b) first implied in Fitzgerald has since expanded, most
notably as a remedy for discriminatory bumping.3 2 De-
spite some expansion, however, this remedy has signifi-
cant limitations. Courts have not extended protection to
passengers alleging discrimination based on factors other
than race or improper bumping. 3 In such cases, the
courts have found the preferential treatment or discrimi-
nation justified by the air carriers' required compliance
with law, rules or regulations.3 4
At the threshold, the court must determine whether the
conduct alleged to be discriminatory and in violation of
the statute falls within the scope of conduct the statute
27 Fitzgerald, 229 F.2d at 500.
28 Id. The court held that 49 U.S.C. § 484(b) (1952) (the previous codification
of section 404(b)) "is for the benefit of persons, including passengers, using the
facilities of air carriers. Consequently, by implication, its violation creates an ac-
tionable civil right for the vindication of which a civil action may be maintained by
any such person who has been harmed by the violation." Id. at 501. The court
applied the analysis found later in Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975). See infra note
82 for a discussion of the analysis.
29 Fitzgerald, 229 F.2d at 502.
3o Id.
31 Id.
32 Rydstrom, supra note 16, at 535.
- Id. at 536.
s1 Id.
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seeks to prevent.3 5 The statute reaches air carriers' dis-
criminatory interference with the right to access air facili-
ties.36 The Third Circuit stated this test especially
succinctly: "it is this denial of access to air facilities,
whether caused directly, by outright refusal of permission
to board, or indirectly, by burdening the potential user
with special requirements not applied to the general pub-
lic, which is critical."13 7 This limitation led to denial of re-
lief in several cases. 8
A more formidable obstacle to the protection offered by
section 404(b)3 9 lies in the discretion granted air carriers
by the Federal Aviation Act and other applicable rules and
regulations to ensure safety.40 Perhaps the broadest such
discretion derives from section 1511 of the Federal Avia-
tion Act.4 ' Section 1511 confers broad authority on air
carriers to refuse boarding based on safety concerns.42
Nevertheless, even this expansive grant of discretion must
be balanced with the protections of section 404(b). 3
35 Id. at 539.
36 Id. at 540.
57 Polansky v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 523 F.2d 332, 336 (3d Cir. 1975).
38 E.g., id. (holding that supplying inferior ground accommodations was not
conduct meant to be prevented by the statute); Mason v. Belieu, 543 F.2d 215,
221 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 852 (1976) (holding that failure to comfort or
assist the distraught wife of a passenger denied boarding was not conduct meant
to be prevented by the statute).
39 49 U.S.C. app. § 1374(b) (1988).
40 See, e.g., 14 C.F.R. § 25.803(c) (1991) (requiring that the aircraft can be com-
pletely evacuated within 90 seconds); 14 C.F.R. § 91.3(a) (1991) (giving pilot ulti-
mate responsibility for aircraft safety).
41 49 U.S.C. § 1511 (1988).
4.2 49 U.S.C. § 1511(a) (1988). Section 1511(a) provides that "subject to rea-
sonable rules and regulations prescribed by the Secretary of Transportation, any
such carrier may also refuse transportation of a passenger or property when, in
the opinion of the carrier, such transportation would or might be inimical to
safety of flight." Id.
43 O'Carroll v. American Airlines, Inc., 863 F.2d 11 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 490
U.S. 1106 (1989).
The dicretion conferred by the above section, [49 U.S.C. § 1511]
while decidedly expansive, is not unfettered. Section 1374 [codifica-
tion of section 404(b)] provides that all air carriers must "provide
safe and adequate service, equipment, and facilities ... [and] estab-
lish, observe, and enforce just and reasonable ... rules, regulations
and practices relating to [air travel] . . . or subject any particular
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In Hingson v. Pacific Southwest Airlines44 full play was
given to reciprocally limiting provisions of the Federal
Aviation Act. While section 404(b) prohibited unjust dis-
crimination by air carriers, other FAA provisions ap-
peared to confer broad authority on pilots and air carriers
to discriminate for proper safety-related reasons. 45 Hing-
son, a blind passenger traveling with a guide dog, sued
Pacific Southwest Airlines (PSA), alleging unlawful dis-
crimination. PSA personnel insisted that Hingson sit in a
bulkhead seat. The only applicable PSA policy manual re-
striction stated that blind passengers should not be al-
lowed to sit by emergency exits.
Although the issues on appeal were evidentiary, they
arose from Hingson's attempt to show violation of section
404(b). The parties and the court agreed that the basic
issue litigated at trial was "whether PSA acted unreasona-
bly in demanding that Hingson take a bulkhead seat."
46
The appeals court noted that despite the pilot's good faith
in exercising discretion for the safe operation of the
plane, a jury could find that the crew's failure to follow
PSA policies was unreasonable and in violation of Section
404(b). 4 7
The Hingson court did not address the interaction be-
tween sections 1511 and 404(b) of the Federal Aviation
Act. In Williams v. Trans World Airlines,48 however, the Sec-
ond Circuit formulated a test to determine the propriety
of an air carrier's exercise of power under section 1511.
The basic inquiry is whether the conduct of the air carrier
was rational and reasonable in light of the circumstances
as they appeared at the time.49
person ... to any unjust discrimination or any undue or unreasona-
ble prejudice or disadvantage in any respect whatsoever."
Id. at 12-13.
44 743 F.2d 1408 (9th Cir. 1984).
45 Id. at 1413 n.5.
46 Id. at 1413.
47 Id. at 1412 n.6.
48 509 F.2d 942 (2d Cir. 1975).
49 Id. at 948.
The test of whether or not the airline properly exercised its power
91319921
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In Williams the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
informed Trans World Airlines (TWA) that Williams, a
known fugitive, was planning to fly on TWA and that his
arrival at his destination might be accompanied by a dem-
onstration.50 In response to TWA's requests for more in-
formation, the FBI provided TWA with a copy of the FBI
Wanted Bulletin regarding Williams. 5' The Bulletin
stated that Williams carried a gun, was schizophrenic, and
advocated violence.52 The court held, based on this infor-
mation, that TWA had reasonably and properly exercised
its authority pursuant to section 1511 to refuse passage to
Williams.53 In discussing the interaction between sections
404(b) and 1511 as a prologue to the formulation of its
test, the court stated:
[We are] of the opinion that Congress did not intend that
the provisions of section 1374 [codification of section
404(b)] would limit or render inoperative the provisions
of section 1511 in the face of evidence which would cause
a reasonably careful and prudent air carrier ... to form
the opinion that the presence aboard a plane of the pas-
senger-applicant "would or might be inimical to safety of
flight." 5
4
The Ninth Circuit adopted the Williams test in Cordero v.
Cia Mexicana De Aviacion.5 5 In so doing, the court cited as
a supporting factor the absence of legislative history sug-
gesting congressional intent to limit protections of section
404(b) by enactment of section 1511.56 The court stated a
under § 1511 to refuse passage to an applicant or ticket-holder rests
upon the facts and circumstances of the case as known to the airline
at the time it formed its opinion and made its decision and whether
or not the opinion and decision were rational and reasonable and
not capricious or arbitrary in the light of those facts and
circumstances.
Id.
50 Id. at 944.
31 Id. at 945.
52 Id.
53 Williams, 509 F.2d at 948.
54 Id.
55 681 F.2d 669 (9th Cir. 1982).
-- Id. at 672.
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belief that, by judging the air carrier's exercise of section
1511 power based on the information available at the
time, "the test provide[d] a reasonable balance between
safety concerns and the right of a ticket-holder to be free
from unwarranted discrimination. '57
Plainly, protections offered passengers under section
404(b) are significantly limited by other factors. Courts
weigh the discriminatory conduct (provided it falls within
the scope of the statute) against the airline's safety con-
cerns based on the information available to it at the time.
This standard requires only minimal investigation by the
air carrier since critical decisions often must be made
within minutes.58
II. SECTION 504 OF THE REHABILITATION ACT
OF 1973
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act 59 states that no
program or activity receiving federal financial assistance
may discriminate against "otherwise qualified handi-
capped individual[s]" solely on the basis of handicap. 60
This act appeared to provide protection for those passen-
gers who felt that air carriers had practiced discrimination
based on a handicap. In practice, however, its application
to commercial air carriers was quite limited.
In Anderson v. USAir 61 a blind passenger alleged that
USAir unlawfully discriminated against him by excluding
him from the exit row seat to which he was assigned. An-
derson alleged violation of section 504 of the Rehabilita-
tion Act, among other statutes. The court found no
violation of section 504 based on the facts of the case.62
The court stated that the seating requirement was based
57 Id.
58 Williams, 509 F.2d at 948.
59 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1988).
6 Id. The Supreme Court has defined this class as "[a]n otherwise qualified
person is one who is able to meet all of a program's requirements in spite of his
handicap." S.E. Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 406 (1979).
61 619 F. Supp. 1191 (D.D.C. 1985), aft'd, 818 F.2d 49 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
62 Id. at 1195.
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on safety concerns relating to the ability of blind persons
to perform emergency exit tasks and thus was not discrim-
inatory.63 The court was, however, prepared to apply sec-
tion 504 to USAir. It did so by designating "air travel" as
a program receiving federal financial assistance.6
Other courts, however, refused to apply section 504 to
commercial air carriers.65 These courts looked beyond a
program of "air travel" and limited application of section
504 to direct recipients of federal financial assistance.66
They rejected contentions that indirect subsidies such as
technical assistance, airport construction funding, air traf-
fic controllers, 6 7 or government mail contracts68 were suf-
ficient to trigger the Act's protections.
The courts that refused to apply section 504 to com-
mercial air carriers proved prophetic. In 1986 the
Supreme Court foreclosed this avenue of protection
against commercial air carrier discrimination. In United
States Department of Transportation v. Paralyzed Veterans of
America 69 the Court held that section 504 does not apply
to commercial airlines. 70 Thereafter, section 504's man-
date not to discriminate applied only to "those who are in
a position to accept or reject those obligations as a part of
the decision whether or not to 'receive' federal funds. ' 7 1
The only parties who fit this description were the airport
operators who received federal funds.72
63 Id.
6 Id. at 1194.
65 See Angel v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 519 F. Supp. 1173 (D.C. Cir.
1981), overruled by Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. CAB, 752 F.2d 694 (D.C. Cir.
1985), rev'd sub nom. United States Dep't of Transp. v. Paralyzed Veterans of Am.,
477 U.S. 597 (1986) (see infra notes 69-72 for a discussion of this Supreme Court
decision); Jacobsen v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1202 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. dis-
missed, 471 U.S. 1062 (1985); Hingson v. Pacific Southwest Airline, 743 F.2d 1408
(9th Cir. 1984).
Angel, 519 F. Supp. at 1178; Hingson, 743 F.2d at 1415.
67 Angel, 519 F. Supp. at 1178.
- Hingson, 743 F.2d at 1414.
69 477 U.S. 597 (1986).
70 Id.
7' Id. at 606.
7 Id.
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III. AIR CARRIER ACCESS ACT OF 1986
Within three months of the Supreme Court's decision
in Paralyzed Veterans of America, Congress considered a bill
designed to overturn the decision. 73 The Air Carrier Ac-
cess Act (ACAA) passed through both houses" quickly and
was enacted into law on October 2, 1986. 74 On its face,
the law appears to be an outright prohibition of differen-
tial treatment of handicapped or impaired passengers.75
In practice, however, both the legislative history and the
Secretary of Transportation's authority to implement the
law through regulations limit this protection.
The legislative history of the ACAA suggests that Con-
gress did not mean to compromise existing DOT and
FAA safety regulations by enacting the law. 76 Further-
more, the Secretary of Transportation was directed to
"promulgate regulations to ensure non-discriminatory
treatment of qualified handicapped individuals consistent
with safe carriage of all passengers on air carriers."'77 These
safety-related limitations became substantial barriers to
protection against discrimination when the DOT and the
FAA simultaneously promulgated regulations implement-
7- 132 CONG. REC. 21,770 (1986). Senator Robert Dole, the author of the bill
stated: "[t]he purpose of the legislation is quite simple. It overturns the recent
Supreme Court decision in the case of Paralyzed Veterans of America versus the
Department of Transportation." Id. Senator Alan Cranston, a principal co-spon-
sor of the bill, expressed his "deep disappointment at the outcome of the case and
echoed Dole's commitment to overturning the high court's ruling." Id. at 21,772.
Senator Howard Metzenbaum supported the bill because he felt it "undoes the
damage perpetuated by the Supreme Court ruling." Id.
74 See Act of Oct. 2, 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-435, 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. (100 Star.)
1080 (codified at 49 U.S.C § 1374 (1988)). The ACAA was considered and passed
in the Senate on August 15, 1986. It was considered and passed in the House on
September 18, 1986. Id.
75 49 U.S.C. § 1374(c)(1) (1988). The relevant text of the law is as follows:
"[n]o air carrier may discriminate against any otherwise qualified handicapped in-
dividual, by reason of such handicap, in the provision of air transportation." Id.
76 132 CONG. REC. S11784-08 (1986). Senator Robert Dole, principal author of
the bill, said "[o]ur intent ... is that so long as the procedures of each airline are
safe as determined by the FAA, there should be no restrictions placed upon air
travel by handicapped persons. Any restrictions that the procedures may impose
must be only for safety reasons found necessary by the FAA." Id.
77 Pub. L. No. 99-435, 100 Stat. 1080 (1986) (emphasis added).
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ing the ACAA.78
The effect of safety regulations on ACAA protections
was illustrated in Tallarico v. Trans World Airlines,79 the
principal case in which the Eighth Circuit recognized a
private right of action under the ACAA. 80 The case in-
volved Polly Tallarico, a fourteen-year-old cerebral palsy
victim. TWA denied Polly the right to board the plane
unaccompanied by an attendant because of physical
handicaps including impaired abilities to walk and talk.
The jury found, and the Eighth Circuit agreed, that TWA
violated the ACAA, 8 t which required a finding that Polly
was an "otherwise qualified handicapped individual"
within the meaning of the statute.82
This illustrates the operation of safety-related limita-
tions in curtailing the protection offered by the ACAA.
The statute explicitly circumscribes coverage to "other-
wise qualified handicapped individuals. ' 83 This requires
78 See infra notes 100-136 and accompanying text for a discussion of DOT and
FAA regulation of exit row seating.
79 881 F.2d 566 (8th Cir. 1989).
-o Id. at 570.
81 Id. at 568.
82 49 U.S.C. § 1374(c) (1988); Tallarico, 881 F.2d at 569. The district court ap-
plied the analysis of implied private rights of action adopted by the Supreme
Court in Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975). There the Court listed four relevant
factors:
First, is plaintiff "one of the class for whose especial benefit the stat-
ute was enacted." . . . Second, is there any indication of legislative
intent, explicit or implicit, either to create such a remedy or to deny
one? ... Third, is it consistent with the underlying purposes of the
legislative scheme to imply such a remedy for the plaintiff? ... And
finally, is the cause of action one traditionally relegated to state law,
in an area basically the concern of the States, so that it would be
inappropriate to infer a cause of action based solely on federal law?
881 F.2d at 568. The appellate court applied the same analysis in affirming the
district court's decision that the ACAA impliedly provides a private cause of ac-
tion. Id. at 570.
83 49 U.S.C. § 1374(c) (1988). The statute, however, does not define the term.
The legislative history of the ACAA indicates that the term is meant to be consis-
tent with the definition in 14 C.F.R. § 382.3(c) (1988). S. REP. No. 400, 99th
Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2328, 2332. Therein a
qualified handicapped person is one who tenders payment for air transportation,
whose carriage will not violate Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) regulations
and who is willing and able to comply with reasonable safety requests of the air-
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that a passenger possess the ability and willingness to
comply with reasonable safety requests of airline person-
nel or, alternatively, that a handicapped passenger be ac-
companied by a person who can ensure compliance.8 4
While the Eighth Circuit found that Polly Tallarico was
otherwise qualified and not in need of an attendant,85
many other handicapped individuals would not meet the
"otherwise qualified" standard. Those passengers cannot
avail themselves of the protection offered by the ACAA
unless they travel with an attendant. This requirement
doubles the cost of air fare and may be prohibitively ex-
pensive for many handicapped persons.
IV. SEATING ASSIGNMENTS AND EXIT ROW
SEATING
The application of the ACAA to seating assignments il-
lustrates the ultimate effect that safety regulations may
have on protection against discrimination offered by the
ACAA. By enacting the ACAA Congress intended to
overturn Paralyzed Veterans of America and bind air carriers
who were not recipients of federal funds to non-discrimi-
line personnel or if unable to comply, who is accompanied by a responsible adult
passenger who can ensure compliance with such a request.
The pertinent regulation contains a more particularized definition:
"Qualified handicapped person" means, with respect to the provi-
sion of air transportation, a handicapped person:
(1) Who tenders payment for air transportation; (2) Whose
carriage will not violate the requirements of the Federal Avia-
tion Regulations ... or, in the reasonable expectation of car-
rier personnel designated under Section 382.13(a),
jeopardize the safe completion of the flight or the health or
safety of other persons; and (3) Who is willing, and able to
comply with reasonable requests of airline personnel or, if
not, is accompanied by a responsible adult passenger who can
ensure that the requests are complied with. A request will not
be considered reasonable if:
(i) It is inconsistent with this part; or
(ii) It is neither safety-related nor necessary for the
provision of air transportation.
14 C.F.R. § 382.3(c) (1990).
84 14 C.F.R. § 382.3(c) (1990).
15 Tallarico, 881 F.2d at 569.
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natory policies with regard to disabled passengers.8 6
Conversely, since implementation of the ACAA, air carri-
ers have excluded the disabled from exit rows.
A. SEATING ASSIGNMENTS
In 1990, the DOT promulgated regulations to ensure
non-discriminatory treatment of qualified handicapped in-
dividuals, as directed by the ACAA. 8 7 Prior to the enact-
ment of these regulations, air carriers were allowed a
great deal of discretion in fashioning seating policies., In
1962, the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) approved some
criteria regarding types of passengers acceptable for air
transport.89 After 1982, seating policies were formed in
part by CAB regulations issued to implement section 504
of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.90 These regulations
merely required airline policies to be safety-related or
necessary for the provision of air transportation. 91
Air carriers designed policies on seating, exit row seat-
ing in particular, to comply with certain FAA safety re-
quirements. Relevant provisions require that an air
carrier be capable of evacuating a full aircraft within 90
seconds 92 and that access to emergency exit windows be
free from obstruction.93 Aside from the general CAB
guidelines and FAA safety requirements, air carriers were
free to fashion their own seating policies. These policies
- See Cordero v. Cia Mexicana De Aviacion, 681 F.2d 669, 669 (9th Cir. 1982).
87 49 U.S.C. § 1374 (1988).
88 Anderson, 619 F. Supp. 1191, 1194 (D.D.C. 1985), aff'd, 818 F.2d 49 (D.C. Cir.
1987).
89 OFFICE OF AVIATION MEDICINE OF THE FAA, EMERGENCY ESCAPE OF HANDI-
CAPPED AIR TRAVELERS, Doc. No. FAA-AM-77-11 at 1. (1976).
9 47 Fed. Reg. 25,938 (1982). The Supreme Court held section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act inapplicable to commercial air carriers in United States Depart-
ment of Transportation v. Paralyzed Veterans of America, 477 U.S. 597 (1986).
See supra notes 69-72 and accompanying text for a discussion of this case. This
finding of inapplicability would not alter the effect of CAB regulations imple-
mented pursuant to the Rehabilitation Act on formation of airline policies before
the case was decided. See Anderson, 619 F. Supp. at 1194.
9- 14 C.F.R. § 382.3(c)(3)(ii) (1990).
92 14 C.F.R. §§ 121.291 & 25.803(c) (1990).
93 14 C.F.R. § 121.310(f(3) (1990).
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were, as discussed earlier, subject to challenge as unlaw-
fully discriminatory under existing statutes. Such chal-
lenges have been fairly rare and have met with varying
success.
Fitzgerald94 may be read as a challenge to an air carrier's
seating assignment policy. Pan American agents "refused
to allow plaintiffs to reboard the.., plane and to continue
on the flight.., in their assigned first-class seats" because they
were black.95 The Court held that exclusion of the plain-
tiffs was unlawful, and the case resulted in recognition of a
private right of action under section 404(b).9 6 Although
the court's opinion also focused on the exclusion of the
plaintiffs, the language quoted above suggested that un-
lawful discrimination in seating assignments might also
evoke a private right of action against an air carrier.
Hingson v. Pacific Southwest Airlines97 resolved any doubt
as to the existence of such an action. This case involved a
direct challenge to an air carrier's seating assignment as
unlawful under section 404(b). 98 Hingson, a blind man,
objected to being forced to sit in the front row of the air-
plane. The appellate court held that the air carrier acted
unreasonably and in violation of the statute.99 Thus, the
Hingson court clearly recognized a private right of action
for unlawful discrimination in seating assignments.
B. EXIT Row SEATING
As with seating policies in general, air carriers have had
great discretion and little governmental guidance in for-
mulating exit row seating policies. CAB regulations im-
plementing section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of
-4 229 F.2d 499 (2d Cir. 1956), rev'd sub nom. on other grounds, Prescription Plan
Serv. Corp. v. Franco, 552 F.2d 493 (2d Cir. 1977); see supra notes 25-31 for a
relevant discussion of this case.
95 229 F.2d at 500 (emphasis added).
- Id. at 509; see supra note 20 for a discussion of the enactments and codifica-
tions of sections 404(a) and 404(b).
97 743 F.2d 1408 (9th Cir. 1984); see supra notes 44-47 and accompanying text
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197300 did not speak directly to the issue of exit row seat-
ing. The preamble, however, suggested that it might be
reasonable practice "to ask some handicapped passen-
gers, along with children and others who might have
trouble opening an emergency exit, not to sit in exit rows,
while permitting able-bodied passengers to sit there."''°
A study conducted in 1973 by the FAA's Civil Aeromed-
ical Institute (CAMI)' 0 2 provides the primary empirical
basis for the CAB's suggestions, as well as for the DOT's
and the FAA's rules regarding exit row seating. The study
was prompted by the CAB's request to DOT in 1972 for
definitive safety standards governing carriage of the hand-
icapped.10 3 The CAB requested this study because air
carriers were inconsistently interpreting and applying ex-
isting rules. 0 4 CAMI and FAA Flight Standards person-
nel developed a test program to obtain data on evacuation
problems associated with the handicapped. 0 5 This study
compared the times required for handicapped, non-hand-
icapped, and non-handicapped individuals feigning vari-
ous handicaps to make their way unaided to an exit.10 6
The study concluded that people with disabilities in-
creased the time required for total evacuation of an air-
craft through floor-level exits. 0 7
Critics of the study have suggested that the limited
measurement of time required to move to an exit may
bear little relationship to a passenger's ability to open the
exit and perform other functions necessary to facilitate an
escape.108 The FAA defended their use of this measure-
ment as a basis upon which to formulate seating policy in
the context of a chilling scenario: "A passenger aircraft
-0 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1988); 47 Fed. Reg. 25,936 (1982).
to, Id.
102 FAA CIVIL AEROMEDICAL INSTITUTE, EMERGENCY ESCAPE OF HANDICAPPED
AIR TRAVELERS, DOC. No. FAA-AM-77-11 (July 1977).
103 Id. at 1.
104 Id.
1- Id. at 1-2.
-o Id. at 4.
107 Id. at 31, table 10.
10 55 Fed. Reg. 8054, 8058 (1990).
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crashes. Inside the cabin there are many survivors. A fire
begins. If the passengers are to stay alive, they must get
out of the aircraft as soon as they can. Seconds mean the
difference between life and death."'10 9 Thus, the FAA rea-
soned, the delays associated with handicapped passengers
(from seat to exit) were relevant to evacuation in gen-
eral. "o If they occurred at the beginning of an exit queue,
traffic would back up. Very possibly, fewer passengers
would escape in the critical moments before becoming
overwhelmed by smoke, fire, explosion, or flooding."'
Additionally, the FAA argued that "[iun many cases, it is
readily apparent that the cause of slow progress ... also
would affect the person's ability to open an emergency
exit door."'" 2 Study findings supported this argument.
The evacuation times for handicapped passengers were
slower when using a window exit." 3 The FAA pointed
out that a modest increase in complexity (from a floor
level to a window exit) slowed handicapped passengers'
evacuation time. This fact led to the logical conclusion
that "additional complexity, such as finding and manipu-
lating emergency exit opening mechanisms, would im-
pose additional burdens on persons with handicaps and
cause delays." 14
Critics of the use of the study as a basis for CAB exit
row seating policy guidelines also point out that the study
did not include statistically valid samples of people with
the numerous impairments addressed by the guidelines
and rules." 5 While this criticism may be valid, the FAA is
not without additional data supporting conclusions drawn
in the CAMI study. The FAA also relied on a 1970 study
'o Id. at 8055.
11o Id. at 8057.
I Id.
1'2 Id. at 8058.
113 Id.
114 Id.
1,- 55 Fed. Reg. at 8056.
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by the FAA's Office of Aviation Medicine" t6 and a memo-
randum based on CAMI accident reports. ' 7 These docu-
ments analyzed data from actual events.
The 1970 study concluded that "[i]n aircraft accidents
in which decelerative forces do not result in massive cabin
destruction and overwhelming trauma to passengers, sur-
vival is determined largely by the ability of the uninjured
passenger to make his way from a seat to an exit within time
limits imposed by the thermotoxic environment.""' 8 The CAMI
memorandum was written at a time when the CAMI Cabin
Safety Data Bank contained 132 entries involving
problems with handicapped or impaired people likely to
affect an emergency exit.' 19 The memorandum analyzed
50 of these entries and generally reinforced the conclu-
sions drawn from the CAMI study.12 0
Based on information from all of these sources, the
FAA "concluded that it is more probable than not that
persons with handicaps that prevent them from perform-
ing certain evacuation functions would be likely to impede
emergency evacuations if seated in an exit row."' 2' This
conclusion forms the basis of the most recent actions by
the DOT concerning regulation of exit row seating 22 and
the FAA's safety rule restricting exit row seating. 23
These rules became effective simultaneously. 24 DOT's
section 382.37 on seat assignments simply prohibits ex-
clusion of any qualified handicapped person from any seat
based on the passenger's handicap. 25 This prohibition is
subject to exceptions involving involuntary behavior and
116 Id. at 8058-59 (citing OFFICE OF AVIATION MEDICINE OF THE FAA, SURVIVAL
IN EMERGENCY ESCAPE FROM PASSENGER AIRCRAFT, DoC. No. AM70-16 (1970)).
117 55 Fed. Reg. at 8059 (citing OFFICE OF AVIATION MEDICINE OF THE FAA,





121 55 Fed. Reg. at 8059.
122 55 Fed. Reg. 8008, 8050 (1990) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. § 382.37).
123 55 Fed. Reg. 8054, 8072 (1990) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. § 121.585).
124 See supra note 78.
,2- 55 Fed. Reg. 8008, 8050 (1990) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. § 382.37).
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accommodation of guide animals. 126 Most importantly,
the prohibition is subject to FAA safety regulations. 27
FAA section 121.585 contains the substance of the cur-
rent restrictions on exit row seating.'28 The rule basically
provides that air carrier personnel must determine
whether passengers seated in the exit row are suitable. 29
No passengers may be seated in the exit row if they are:
-physically unable to perform each of ten enumerated
functions necessary to facilitate escape;
-under 15 years of age;
-unable to read and understand the printed instructions
regarding emergency evacuation provided by the carrier;
-unable to understand oral crew commands spoken in
English;
-unable to see well enough to find the exit, read exit in-
structions, and determine if outside conditions preclude
opening the exit;
-unable to hear shouted instructions;
-unable to impart information orally;
-accompanied by small children; or
-likely to be injured in performing escape functions.' 0
The rule also requires dissemination of exit row seating
criteria in passenger briefings and in passenger informa-
tion cards.' 3 ' Air carriers must request passengers to
identify themselves if they are unsuitable for exit row seat-
ing for reasons not easily discernable.13 2
The stated goal of these rules is patently unobjection-
able: to provide optimum conditions for escape from air-
126 Id.
127 Section 382.37(a) provides in part that "[c]arriers shall not exclude any
qualified handicapped individual from any seat in an exit row or other location or
require that a qualified handicapped individual sit in any particular seat, on the
basis of handicap, except in order to comply with the requirements of an FAA
safety regulation." 55 Fed. Reg. 8008, 8050 (1990) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R.
§ 382.37(a)).
128 55 Fed. Reg. 8054, 8072-73 (1990)(to be codified at 14 C.F.R. § 121.585).
129 Id. at 8072.
Iso Id. at 8072-73.
13, Id. at 8073.
132 Id.
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craft in emergency situations.' 3 3 Yet the means chosen to
reach that goal - seating only those who are able-bodied
near the emergency exits - have proved exceedingly con-
troversial. While the superficial debate revolves around
relative safety virtues, an apparent undercurrent of fear
exists that some lives are being considered less valuable
than others. 34 This fear is inevitably aroused by seating
rules which reserve seats nearest the exit to those tradi-
tionally favored members of society, the able-bodied. 35
Certainly, this fear adds to the fervor of the debate. It is
not, however, the only force driving those opposed to the
exit row seating restrictions. Groups opposed to the FAA
regulation raise several important issues.
V. THE DEBATE
While the debate over exit row seating long pre-dated
the enactment of the ACAA, i3 6 it coalesced during the
regulatory negotiations preceding promulgation of the
DOT ruling on permissible criteria for seat assignments
under the ACAA. Pursuant to the Federal Advisory Com-
mittee Act, interest groups affected by the rulemaking
formed an advisory committee to negotiate with the DOT
and other representatives of the Federal Government's in-
terests. 137 Despite agreement on many points and sub-
13 Id. at 8054.
13, See Christopher Fotos, Blind Passengers Protest Exit Row Seating Policy, Av. WK.
& SPACE TECH., Mar. 27, 1988, at 94. This article states that "[a] number of air-
line industry veterans have told Snider of past discrimination against blacks, who
similarly were not seated in exit rows, partly because 'the life of a black person was
not considered as valuable as that of a white person.' " Id.
'-1 55 Fed. Reg. at 8054-55. The regulation states that "[t]he issues addressed
by the rule are among the most difficult and controversial ever addressed by the
FAA, for they require, in the interest of what is essential for the safety of all pas-
sengers, that some passengers be treated differently from other passengers, de-
pending on their physical abilities." Id.
136 See Anderson v. USAir, 619 F. Supp. 1191 (D.D.C. 1985).
137 55 Fed. Reg. 8008, 8009-10 (1990) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. § 382.37).
The regulation summarizes the composition of the committees:
[D]isability groups represented on the committee included the Para-
lyzed Veterans of America (PVA), the National Council on In-
dependent Living, the American Council of the Blind, National
Federation of the Blind (NFB), National Association of Protection
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stantial progress on others, the negotiations came to an
impasse on the issue of exit row seating. Due to the stale-
mate, the advisory committee issued no final recommen-
dations.'3 8  DOT then proposed its rule on seating
assignments. 3 9 The proposed rule prohibited exclusion
of passengers from exit rows on the basis of handicap,
subject to minor exceptions and subject to compliance
with FAA safety rules. 40 Thus, the debate moved to the
comment period preceding the FAA's rulemaking.
A. CIVIL RIGHTS OR SAFETY?
At the most fundamental level, the FAA and the oppos-
ing disabled groups' 4' disagree over the nature of their
debate. While the FAA characterizes the debate as one
concerning safety, 42 disabled groups assert that the safety
issue is spurious and that the real issue is civil rights. 143
Specifically, the disabled allege that those with easily iden-
tifiable disabilities will be excluded from exit rows while
those with equally incapacitating, but hidden, health
and Advocacy Systems, National Association of the Deaf, and the So-
ciety for Advancement of Travel for the Handicapped. Air travel in-
dustry representatives included the Air Transport Association
(ATA), Regional Airline Association (RAA). National Air Carrier As-
sociation, National Air Transportation Association, Airport Opera-
tors Council International/American Association of Airport
Executive, and the Association of Flight Attendants. In addition to
the Department of Transportation, the Architectural and Transpor-
tation Barriers Compliance Board (ATBCB) represented the federal
government's interest. A neutral mediator from the federal Media-
tion and Conciliation Service chaired the committee.
Id.
138 Id. at 8010. Consequently, the Office of the Secretary of Transportation
made its own proposal on exit row seating. 55 Fed. Reg. 8054, 8055 (1990).
I9 Id. at 8008.
140 Id. at 8050.
14, Those submitting comments to the FAA following its notice of proposed
rulemaking (NPRM) were dominated by blind individuals and by groups with
blind membership. Foremost among the groups was the National Federation of
the Blind (NFB). 55 Fed. Reg. at 8055-56. Since most of the comments came
from the NFB, its issues will be focused on in this comment.
142 55 Reg. at 8054 (stating that "[tihis action is intended to further safety for
all passengers").
141 Fotos, supra note 134, at 94.
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problems will be allowed to sit in those rows.' 44 Since the
regulations result in preferential treatment of those with
hidden health problems, they are contrary to the ACAA
because they promote unlawful discrimination against the
obviously disabled.1 45
The FAA provides only a brief response to these allega-
tions. The Federal Register devotes a mere thirteen
pages to a discussion of the issues involved, and only
three pages address civil rights issues.146 Clearly, each
side of the debate hopes to frame the issue to its own ad-
vantage. Allegations of discrimination garner close atten-
tion, particularly in the context of rules that place the
disadvantaged at a further disadvantage. On the other
hand, people (including lawmakers) are likely to look fa-
vorably on any rule which promotes aviation safety, espe-
cially a rule with commonsense appeal.
B. CIVIL RIGHTS
The FAA's response to charges of discrimination is
brief. The response appears under the heading Whether
the FAA's Exit Row Seating Proposal Discriminates Against Per-
sons With Disabilities, Especially the Blind.'47 It is so weak as
to be humorous. Therein, the FAA points out that the
aviation community considers exit row seating to be a
safety issue and that two editorials, one appearing in the
New York Times and one appearing in Aviation Week and
Space Technology, agreed that no discrimination was in-
volved. 48 The FAA also cites as support the fact that rep-
resentatives of disabled groups were included in the
Secretary of Transportation's advisory committee. Fi-
nally, the FAA flatly asserts that the final rules base seat-
ing decisions on "neutral nondiscriminatory criteria
applicable to all passengers."1 49
144 Id.; 55 Fed. Reg. 8054, 8060 (1990).
15 See 55 Fed. Reg. 8054, 8060 (1990).
146 Id. at 8056-71.




The substance of the government's defense to charges
of discrimination lies at the end of a section entitled
Whether the FAA Exit Row Seating Rule Will Compromise Air
Safety.' 50 Recognition is given that Congress specifically
intended the ACAA to close a gap in coverage of Section
504 of the Rehabilitation Act.'-" Therefore, the Rehabili-
tation Act standards of reasonable accommodation and
meaningful access enunciated by the Supreme Court' 5 2
apply to the ACAA.' 53
The FAA maintains that disabled passengers are not de-
nied meaningful access to air transportation by the exit
row seating rules. The restriction is narrowly defined and
excludes only people with certain disabilities - those
which the FAA has determined are likely to impede evacu-
ation. 154 Most persuasively, the FAA points out that the
regulation does not deny this narrowly defined class of
people access to air transportation. It excludes them only
from seats in the exit rows, a small fraction of available
seating. 155
The FAA's position under Rehabilitation Act standards
is compelling. Furthermore, the disabled groups' allega-
tions of disparate impact in violation of the ACAA are un-
availing. The crux of the disabled groups' complaint is
that passengers with hidden health problems are treated
preferentially to those with obvious disabilities simply be-
cause the hidden ailments are either undetected or unde-
tectable at boarding. This argument assumes the
presence of a class of passengers with hidden health
5 Id. at 8061.
5 55 Fed. Reg. at 8062.
112 Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397 (1979); Alexander
v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287 (1985). In these two cases the Supreme Court held that
the Rehabilitation Act required a balance between the non-discriminatory objec-
tives of the statute and the need to contain the statute within reasonable parame-
ters. Davis, 442 U.S. at 410;Alexander, 469 U.S. at 300. This balance requires that
the disabled have meaningful access to benefits offered by a recipient of federal
funds. Meaningful access may necessitate reasonable accommodations in a
benefitted program. Alexander, 469 U.S. at 301.
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problems which would incapacitate them in a time of
emergency. The argument also assumes that such passen-
gers either will not comply with the air carriers'
mandatory request 56 to identify themselves or that they
will be unaware of their own hidden problems and, conse-
quently, will be unable to comply. Alternatively, even
perfectly healthy passengers could incapacitate them-
selves by becoming inebriated after being seated in an
exit row. Little empirical evidence is cited to support
either assumption. Assuming, arguendo, that both assump-
tions are valid and that those with obvious disabilities are
in fact victims of discrimination, the premise still is not
sufficient to find a violation of the non-discriminatory
mandate of the ACAA.157 In order to prevail, the disabled
groups must be able to show that the discrimination is not
justified by safety considerations. 
5 8
C. SAFETY
The disabled groups question whether the FAA has suf-
ficient evidence to establish a safety necessity for restrict-
ing exit row seats.' 5 9 The FAA posits as its evidentiary
basis: (1) the 1973 Civil Aeromedical Institute (CAMI)
study; 60 (2) an accident report and a separate study;' 6'
and (3) anecdotal evidence supplied by air crash
survivors. 162The disabled groups criticize the substantial reliance
116 See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
157 49 U.S.C. § 1374(c) (1988).
158 Id. § 1374(3) (stating that the Secretary of Transportation was instructed to
promulgate regulations "to ensure non-discriminatory treatment of qualified
handicapped individuals consistent with safe carriage of all passengers on air
carriers").
159 55 Fed. Reg. 8054, 8056 (1990).
60 See supra notes 102-115 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
CAMI test.
161 See supra notes 116-121 and accompanying text.
162 55 Fed. Reg. 8054, 8061 (1990). One of the survivors was guided to safety
by a glimpse of light. The same passenger also elected not to open an exit be-
cause it would have admitted smoke and flames into the cabin. The passenger
made this decision based on visual ability to perceive the fire outside the exit
door. Id.
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placed upon the CAMI study by the FAA.' 63  First, the
study measured evacuation time from seat to door only,
and it did not measure performance on other evacuation-
related functions.164 Second, the study did not involve
statistically valid tests on the variety of disabilities that the
rules address. Finally, while the other study 165 and re-
port 66 relied upon by the FAA tend to support the con-
clusions drawn from the CAMI study relating to the
problems encountered in evacuations involving the dis-
abled, 167 the FAA has offered no evidence showing that a
disabled person's presence led, in any instance, to addi-
tional injury or death. 168  Significantly, no FAA rule on
exit row seating was issued after completion of the CAMI
study in 1973.169 If the study was as decisive as is now
claimed by the FAA, it is odd that the FAA instigated no
regulation at the time of the study's completion.
The absence of conclusive evidence linking delays asso-
ciated with the disabled in evacuations to actual injury or
death is often invoked by disabled groups to refute the
legitimacy of the FAA's safety justifications for restricting
exit row seating. 170 This lack of evidentiary linkage is es-
163 Id. at 8056.
164 Id. at 8058. See supra notes 108-114 and accompanying text for a discussion
of the relevance of this measurement.
165 OFFICE OF AVIATION MEDICINE OF THE FAA, SURVIVAL IN EMERGENCY ESCAPE
FROM PASSENGER AIRCRAFT, DOC. No. FAA-AM-70-16 (1970). See supra notes 116-
118 and accompanying text. This study involved three actual emergency evacua-
tions. It did not speak to evacuation of the disabled.
'- OFFICE OF AVIATION MEDICINE OF THE FAA, PROTECTION AND SURVIVAL LAB-
ORATORY MEMORANDUM, DOC. No. FAA-AM-119-87-6 (1987). The memorandum
was based on the FAA Civil Aeromedical Institute's ACCIDENT/INCIDENT BIo-MED-
ICAL DATA REPORTS. See supra notes 119-120 and accompanying text.
167 55 Fed. Reg. 8054, 8059 (1990).
I" Fotos, supra note 134, at 94. Anthony Broderick, FAA Associate Administra-
tor for Flight Standards, "conceded that he could not give an example of a blind
passenger whose presence led to additional injury or death." Id. at 95.
169 55 Fed. Reg. at 8059.
170 See, e.g., News Conference, PR Newswire, Jan. 29, 1988, at 2 (available on
LEXIS, Nexis library, PR file). The National Federation of the Blind, regarding
the need for legislation to block the proposed FAA exit row seating rule, stated:
In all of the recorded history of air travel, blindness has never been a
hazard during emergency evacuations.... There has never been the
slightest difficulty. Only now, with the passage of the new nondis-
9311992]
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pecially significant in light of the fact that the report relied
upon by the FAA surveyed all available entries in the
CAMI Cabin Safety Data Bank.' 7' Of the 3,382 accident/
incident entries, only 132 involved people with disabilities
or other characteristics likely to affect evacuation. 72 This
suggests that evacuations of disabled passengers are not
terribly noteworthy. Fifty entries were closely analyzed in
the report, and these were individually reviewed by the
FAA. 173 While the report indicated that "certain factors
generally impede rapid evacuation,"' 74 the FAA cited no
reported instance in which any of these factors caused ad-
ditional injury or death. In some cases, however, this lack
of evidence is at best inconclusive since air carrier policies
in the past generally excluded disabled passengers from
exit rows. 5 Thus, the relevant evidence from which to
draw conclusions is simply lacking.
VI. THE NATIONAL FEDERATION OF THE BLIND
AND THE WORLD AIRWAYS TEST
The National Federation of the Blind (NFB), other
groups with blind membership and similar concerns, and
the Paralyzed Veterans of America (PVA) were the pri-
mary groups involved in the debates surrounding exit row
seating. 76 The NFB was foremost in resisting exit row
seating restrictions. The belief that the restrictions
thwarted the intent of Congress in enacting the ACAA fu-
eled the NFB's resistance. 77 The ACAA was enacted to
crimination law (Pub. L. No. 99-435) have the bureaucrats at the
FAA decided to make their own rules to impose seat restrictions on
the blind."
Id.




7.5 Fotos, supra note 134, at 95.
176 See supra note 137. With regard to comments received by the FAA, "the
largest number came from groups with blind membership." 55 Fed. Reg. 8054,
8055 (1990).
177 See, e.g. News Conference, PR Newswire, Jan. 29, 1988 (available on LEXIS,
Nexis library, PR file). The NFB stated: On the need for legislation to block the
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relieve disabled passengers from unfounded restric-
tion.' 78 The NFB considered exclusion of the blind from
exit rows to be just such an unfounded restriction. 179
To support its position and to demonstrate the inaccu-
racy of the CAMI study as applied to the blind, the NFB
conducted its own study.18 0 The NFB contends that a test
evacuation it performed in 1985 with World Airways
proves that blind people should not be excluded from the
exit rows. 8 ' The experiment involved two evacuation
drills with twenty blind and ten sighted people. 82 The
experiment was videotaped. The NFB has refused to re-
lease the unedited tape to the FAA, purportedly for fear
that the tape would be unfairly edited or disregarded by
the FAA.'1 3 Therefore, the FAA's analysis of the experi-
ment was limited to eyewitness accounts and to a report
of a Senate Subcommittee hearing in which an NFB offi-
cial discussed certain aspects of the experiment.8 4
Among other findings, the FAA found that the NFB fol-
lowed no testing protocol, provided no properly in-
structed neutral observers, and published no formal
report. 185 It further asserted that the NFB conducted
practice sessions that helped subjects open the exit.'8 6
For these reasons, the FAA concluded that the study was
not scientific. 8 7
Furthermore, far from supporting the NFB's position,
flight attendants participating in the experiment reported
proposed FAA exit row seating rule, "[t]he attempt to impose seat restriction reg-
ulations on the blind disregards the will of Congress expressed in Pub. L. 99-435
and its underlying legislative history. The statute, which was intended to remove
unfounded limitations on the blind, is being turned on its head and used against
the blind by the airlines." Id.
.78 49 U.S.C. § 1374 (1988).
179 See supra note 177.
180 55 Fed. Reg. at 8056.
181 Id.
S82 Fotos, supra note 134, at 94.
183 Id. at 95.
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many problems with the evacuations.188 A second evacua-
tion was aborted partially due to the danger posed to
flight attendants and other passengers, especially those
assisting at the bottom of the slide, by the blind passen-
gers' canes.' 89 The flight attendants stated in affidavits
that a passenger's cane punctured the escape slide,' 90
while the NFB insists that the damage was done by a
sighted woman's high-heeled shoes.' 9' The NFB claims
that the videotape revealed little apparent difference in
exit times between blind and sighted evacuees. Any dif-
ference in evacuation times, however, resulted from "the
flight attendants' singling out the blind for special help
they did not require ... slowing them down."'' 92 Based
on the available evidence, the NFB-World Airways study
does not contradict the FAA's position but tends to sup-
port it. The NFB's failure to release an unedited tape of
the experiment only lends credence to the FAA analysis.
VII. CONCLUSION
The FAA's evidentiary basis that justifies imposition of
exit row seating restrictions consists of the highly criti-
cized CAMI study; a study of actual emergency evacua-
tions that did not involve the disabled; a report that failed
to effectively link disabled passengers to poor results; and
anecdotal evidence. Despite the various weaknesses pre-
viously discussed, in sum, the evidence supports the
FAA's conclusion that "it is more probable than not that
188 Id.
These included the inability of the group to form a double line; hesi-
tancy to jump without being pushed out [a maneuver which put the
flight attendants in danger of being shoved out the exit]; insistence
by a woman with a guide dog that she be allowed to sit down, hold-
ing the dog, instead ofjumping without it; inability to leave the slide
rapidly at the bottom; and failure to catch some passengers when
blind persons assisted at the bottom of the slide.
Id.
181) Id.
'o Fotos, supra note 134, at 95.
1,Id.
112 Id. at 94.
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persons with handicaps that prevent them from perform-
ing certain evacuation functions would be likely to impede
emergency evacuation if seated in an exit row."'' 9 3 The
NFB-World Airways experiment cannot properly be con-
sidered credible evidence until the NFB releases an uned-
ited videotape for examination. Given what is already
known of the study and the eyewitness testimony, the re-
lease is unlikely to provide evidence favorable to the dis-
abled groups' position.
The disabled groups have failed to refute the safety
considerations justifying exit row seating restrictions.
Thus, their allegations of discrimination in violation of
the ACAA are unavailing. Nevertheless, this is a small de-
feat in the face of a larger victory. The DOT promulga-
tion of the ACAA through seat assignments is a broadly
written prohibition of discrimination based on handi-
cap.' 94 This broad protection is subject to only minor ex-
ceptions 9 5 and to FAA safety regulations. Handicapped
passengers, therefore, are no longer at the mercy of in-
consistent air carrier policies. Through the DOT seating
assignment rule, the ACAA acts as "a legal constraint on
• . carrier[s'] discretion to impose additional require-
ments, above the 'minimum standards' found to be neces-
g 55 Fed. Reg. 8054, 8059 (1990).
194 55 Fed. Reg. 8008 (1990) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. § 382.37).
195 Exceptions in coverage exist under the DOT rule for involuntary behaviors
and for service animals. 55 Fed. Reg. 8008, 8050 (1990) (to be codified at 14
C.F.R. § 382). Section 382.37 provides that:
(b) [i]f a person's handicap results in involuntary active behavior
that would result in the person properly being refused transporta-
tion ... and the safety problem could be mitigated to a degree that
would permit the person to be transported consistent with safety if
the person is seated in a particular location, the carrier shall offer the
person that particular seat location as an alternative to being refused
transportation.
(c) If a service animal cannot be accommodated at the seat location
of the qualified handicapped individual whom the animal is accom-
panying ... the carrier shall offer the passenger the opportunity to
move with the animal to a seat location, if present on the aircraft,
where the animal can be accommodated, as an alternative to requir-
ing that the animal travel with checked baggage.
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sary for safety by the FAA, where the additional
requirements affect handicapped persons in a way differ-
ently from other passengers."'' 96 Disabled groups and in-
dividuals may disagree with the wisdom of the FAA's exit
row seating rule, but they must concede that the ACAA
and DOT section 382.37 represent a big step forward in
the search for equal treatment.
196 Id. at 8012.
